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I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Brie{ Statement of the Case
Alternate Energy Holdings Inc. ("AEHI") is the recipient of certain land-use approvals
before Payette County (the "County"), including applications for rezone, conceptual plan, and a
development agreement (collectively, the "Application·').
This appeal should be dismissed and the County's approval of the Application should be
upheld for the following reasons: First, the Payette County Comprehensive Plan (May 2006) (the
"Comprehensive Plan") contains each of the planning elements required by Idaho Code Section

67-6508 and is valid. Second, the County's approval of the Application is in accordance with the
Comprehensive Plan and does not constitute illegal "spot zoning." And, third, the County met
and exceeded each of its notice requirements at every step of its proceedings. Even if H-Hook
LLC ("H-Hook") were correct with regard to its notice argument, there is no violation of HHook' s substantial rights.
Course of Proceedings and Procedural Issues
AEHI and the County largely agree with the Course of Proceedings as identified by HHook, with the exception of Footnote 2, which contains nothing more than H-Hook's own
unsubstantiated supposition that is neither relevant nor part of the record before this Court.
One other item deserves comment: Although the caption of this case would suggest
otherwise, Note 1 of the Appellant's Brief and H-Hook's statement on Page 3 of the Appellant's
Brief ("H-Hook has appealed from portions of that Order") indicate that only H-Hook is
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appealing the decision

the District Court. Therefore, only H-Hook is deemed for purposes of

this appeal as an appellant, and the caption of this Respondent and Intervenor's Brie/is
structured accordingly.
Statemem of Facts
AEHI has been involved in a long and very public application process \Vith the County,
which is the first step in AEHI' s goal of constructing a nuclear power production facility. The
County's approval of the Application allows AEHI to continue the regulatory process 1 for the
project on 500 acres (the "Property") of a larger, approximately 5,000-acre parcel of which
AEHI is the contract-purchaser. Agency Record (Ag. R.) p. 11. The area near the Property
includes non-prime agriculture ground, four confined animal feeding operations (within five
miles of the Property), and Clay Peak Landfill (approximately three miles northwest of the
Property). The nearest residence is over three miles from the Property. Ag. R. p. 4156.
Prior to making its Application to the County, AEHI conducted extensive studies of both
the physical features of the Property and the project's potential land use impacts on the area,
including the area economy. The physical features of the Property and its capacity to support
this use were described in a detailed report prepared by ENERCON Services, Inc., a national
engineering, environmental, technical, and management firm with expertise in the nuclear arena,
including the federal licensing process. Ag. R. p. 22; 222-625; 1120-27. The ENERCON study
concluded that this Property is an appropriate location for the proposed use. An economic, tax
Once local government land use decisions have been addressed, AEHI plans to engage in an extended application
process before federal regulatory agencies, including the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, during which operational
and safety elements of AEHI's proposal will be scrutinized. See 10 C.F.R. 52; Ag. R p. 22-23; Dec. 2, 2010 Tr. p.
23-29.
1
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revenue, and public-service impact study \Vas prepared by Johnson Reid,

a consultant firm

specializing in real estate development and land-use economics. Ag. R. p. 38; 653-84. The
Johnson Reid study showed significant economic benefits for the County and the State of Idaho.
Ag. R. p. 39. While these studies were being conducted, AEHI met with numerous local
governments, officials, and businesses in order to solicit public comment. Ag. R. p. 63-64. Such
comments were incorporated into AEHI' s Application materials, which included discussion and
studies related to land use issues such as: water issues and availability (Ag. R. p. 51;710-72);
school facilities (Ag. R. p. 54-58; 685-709); and area roadways (Ag. R. p. 59-60; 647-652).
Before submitting the Application, AEHI requested the Payette County Board of County
Commissioners (the "Board") to approve an amendment to the County's comprehensive plan.
This amendment designated the Property for industrial uses and was approved by the Board on
June 21, 2010. Ag. R. p. 93-160; 3822-81; 3883-90. With that public hearing process complete,
AEHI submitted the Application 2 on June 22, 2010. Ag. R. p. 1. The Application was accepted
and deemed complete by the County on July 13, 2010. Ag. R. p. 1176.
The County went to great lengths to ensure the public was able to review the Application.
The Application was available for public review at the Planning & Zoning Office beginning in
June 2010-six months before hearings the Planning & Zoning Commission (the

"Commission") hearings in December 2010 and one year before the Board hearings in June

2 The Application included a request to the County for a variance from a height limitation established under Payette
County Code ("PCC"). The County approved the variance request; however, the District Court entered an order
vacating the variance for a number of reasons. That decision has not been appealed and is not before this Court.
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2011. Hard copies and compact discs were available at cost and the County posted the
Application and public testimony online for public download-free of charge. Ag. R. p. 3518.
The County began its review of the Application by convening its Technical Review
Committee (the "Committee''). 1 The Committee conducted numerous public meetings "to
ensure a fair and neutral report. .. for use and review by the ... Commission and the Board." Ag.
R. p. 1236. Each meeting was noticed and each was held at the County engineer's offices

between August and October 2010. Ag. R. p. 1174-1235, 1241 1243, 1336-1341. Thirty-five
city, county, state, and federal governmental agencies and public service providers were notified
of the meetings and were asked to provide comments and/or attend. Ag. R. p. 1244-1245. The
meetings were open to the public. Organizations attending included the Snake River Alliance
and Advocates for the West. Ag. R. p. 1201, 1209, 1228, 1242.
The County engineer presented a report of the Committee's findings at the Commission's
first public hearing on December 2, 2010.Dec.2, 2010 Tr. p. 81-88. At a subsequent hearing,
held on December 10, 2010, the Commission voted to recommend approval of the Application to
the Board per Payette County Code Sections 8-11-8 and 8-5-11, Ag. R. p. 3378-3464.
A group of appellants-including many of H-Hook's co-petitioners before the District
court (referred to herein as the "Petitioners")-appealed the recommendation to the Board.
Petitioners submitted, through attorney and Petitioner James Underwood, forty-one pages of
Payette County Code establishes a "Technical Review Committee" to review an application from the viewpoint of
the technical disciplines represented on the Committee. PCC § 8-5-14.C. I. The Technical Review Committee is
made up of the county engineer, the planning and zoning staff, the applicant, the applicant's engineer, the affected
road department, a city in whose impact area the property may be located, an affected irrigation company, fire
district, utility companies, school district, any affected state or federal agency and any other person requested by the
committee, the commission or the board." PCC § 8-5-14.A.
3
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argument in an appeal filing (Ag. R. p. 3467-3482), an appeal brief (Ag. R. p. 3486-351

and a

reply brief submitted after oral argument. Ag. R. p. 3536-3540. 4 Although the Board determined
at hearing on February 22, 2011 that Petitioners' appeal of the recommendation to approve the
Application \Vas unripe (Ag. R. p. 3547), each of these items were included in the record before
the Board and the District Court
The Commission's recommendation was eventually heard by the Board on June 6, 2011.
Ag. R. p. 3998-4021. After the required written notices were published (Ag. R. p. 4081-83),
written public comment flooded in, much of it in support of the project. See, e.g., Ag. R. p. 35553560, 3564, 3611-18, 3619-54, 3657-59, and 3910. H-Hook provided written testimony directly
(see, e.g., Ag. R. p. 3911-12 (Michael Humphreys/H Hook)) and through its attorney who

provided "Comments and Objections" with hundreds of pages of exhibits. Ag. R. p. 3660-3908.
The June 6, 2011 hearing took place at the Payette High School Auditorium and was
attended by dozens of members of the public. Ag. R. p. 3998-99. The hearing lasted for several
hours and included testimony from AEHI and its consultants discussing a number of topics,
including site feasibility (Ag. R. p. 4000), transmission-line issues and reactor design (id.), water
needs and availability (Ag. R. p. 4001-02), and impacts on area roadways (Ag. R. p. 4003). The
County engineer, who had visited three different nuclear power plants (including Ft. Calhoun
Nuclear (Washington County, Nebraska); Cooper Nuclear (Nemaha County, Nebraska); and
Wolf Creek Nuclear (Coffee County, Kansas)), provided a substantive and detailed report of his
New factual evidence was submitted by Mr. Underwood and considered by the Board. See, e.g., Ag. R. p. 35053512. This was in addition to several letters submitted by Mr. Underwood on behalf of these appellants both before
and after the appeal hearing in front of the Board. See Ag. R. p. 3483, 3485, 3535, 3543-3545. Mr. Underwood
testified on behalf of these appellants at the Board's hearing on February 22, 2011. Ag. R. p. 3530-3532.
4
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findings regarding each plant and their land use effects on their respective communities. Ag. R.
p. 4143-44. Members of the public were each given five minutes (rather than the minimum of
three minutes set by PCC § 1-7-2.D) in which to provide their verbal comments (Ag. R. p. 3999)
and the majority testified in favor of the Application. Ag. R. p. 4007-18. In response to a topic
that was prominently in the news at that time and the subject of many public comments, and with
the permission of the Board prior to the close of the hearing (Ag. R. p. 4018), one of AEHI' s
consultants provided the Board with an overview of the Fukushima Daiichi March 11, 2011
nuclear event and provided comparisons to the proposal by AEHI. Ag. R. p. 3972-95; 4018-21.
The hearing was closed at 10:34 p.m. on June 6, 2011. It was announced at that time that
a decision would be made on June 20, 2011. Ag. R. p. 4021. At public hearing on June 20, 2011,
each Board member deliberated on the record and the Board moved unanimously to approve the
Application. Ag. R. p. 4026. The written decision approving the Application was signed on
August 29, 2011. Ag. R. p. 4160. The Development Agreement was recorded that same day. Ag.
R. p. 4098.

II.
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Per I.AR. 35(b )(5), the County and AEHI hereby set forth as an additional issue
presented on appeal a claim for attorneys' fees and costs in the event the Court dismisses HHook's claims. The claim for attorneys' fees and costs is pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-117
and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41. As will be more fully set forth below, H-Hook's
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arguments and appeals are without a reasonable basis in fact or law and, therefore, satisfy the
standard set forth in Idaho Code Section 12-11

III.
ARGUMENT
A. ST AND ARD OF REVIE\V

The Local Land Use Planning Act (I.C. § 67-6501, et seq.) ("LLUPA'") permits judicial
review of certain land use applications in accordance with the Idaho Administrative Procedures
Act ("IDAPA"). Cm-van v. Board ofCom'rs of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501,508, 148 P.3d
1247, 1254 (2006). "For purposes of judicial review of LLUPA decisions, a local agency
making a land use decision is treated as a government agency under IDAPA."' Id. (citing Urrutia
v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353,357, 2 P.3d 738, 742 (2000)). IDAPA states that the district

court "shall affirm the agency action unless the court finds that the agency's findings, inferences,
conclusions, or decisions: violate constitutional or statutory provisions; exceed statutory
authority; are made upon unlawful procedure; are not supported by substantial evidence on the
record as a whole; or are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion." I.C. § 67-5279(3)
(emphasis added). Further, even if there is such a violation, "agency action shall be affirmed
unless substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced." J.C.§ 67-5279(4) (emphasis
added).
It is the appellant's burden "to first illustrate how the board erred in a manner specified

under Idaho Code Section 67-5279, and then establish that a substantial right has been
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prejudiced. Taylor v. Canyon County Bd.

Com 'rs, 147 Idaho 424,431, 210 P.3d

539

(2009) (citing Druffel v. State, Dept. ofTransp., 136 Idaho 853, 855, 41 P.3d 739, 741 (2002)).
In considering a petition for judicial review, .. [t ]he court shall not substitute its judgment
for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. I.C. § 67-5279(1).
There is a strong presumption in favor not only of a zoning board's actions, but also that a
zoning board has interpreted its own zoning ordinances correctly. Hawkins v. Bonneville County
Bel. ofCom'rs, 151 Idaho228,23L254P.3d 1224. 1227(20Il)(citingSandersOrchardv. Gem
Crity. ex rel. Bel. of Cnty. Comm 'rs, 137 Idaho 695, 698, 52 P.3d 840, 843 (2002)). See also
Cowan, 143 Idaho at 508; Terrazas v. Blaine County ex rel. Bd. ofCom'rs, 147 Idaho 193, 197,

207 P.3d 169, 173 (2009); Hmvard v. Canyon County Bd. of Comm'rs, 128 Idaho 479,480,915
P.2d 709, 710 (1996).
B. THE ADOPTED COMPREHENSIVE PLAN SATISFIES THE COUNTY'S
OBLIGATIONS AND IS VALID UNDER IDAHO LAW

H-Hook argues that the County's approval of the Application is void because, in its
judgment, the Comprehensive Plan is invalid. H-Hook's argument is without merit as it calls for
comprehensive planning requirements that exceed the established parameters set forth in Idaho
Code and in case law. 5

The County and AEHI note that H-Hook's argument is that the rezone is invalid is, at its core, a challenge to the
validity of the Comprehensive Plan, as amended. The context for this challenge is a petition for judicial review.
While a challenge to a comprehensive plan was considered in the context of a rezone approval in Sprenger, Grubb
& Associates, Inc. v. City of Hailey, 133 Idaho 320, 986 P.2d 343, this Court subsequently determined in cases
including Giltner Dairy, LLC v. Jerome County, 145 Idaho 630, 181 P.3d 1238 (2008), Burns Holdings, LLC v.
Madison County Bd. of County Com'rs, 147 Idaho 660,214 P.3d 646 (2008), Taylorv. Canyon County Bd. of
Com 'rs, 147 Idaho 424,210 P.3d 532 (2009) that there was no statute authorizing a petition for judicial review of a
decision to amend a comprehensive plan map. The County and AEHI therefore question whether there is
jurisdiction for this Court to consider what is in actuality a challenge to the Comprehensive Plan.
5
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1. Standards for a Valid Comprehensive Plan
Idaho Code requires every city and county (LC. § 67-6503) to "prepare, implement, and
review and update" its comprehensive plan considering sixteen separate planning components
"as they may apply to land use regulations and actions." LC. § 67-6508 (emphasis added). 6
Within each planning component, the comprehensive plan is to consider: "previous and existing
conditions, trends, compatibility of land uses, desirable goals and objectives, or desirable future
situations." LC. § 67-6508 (emphasis added). Use of the word "or" makes the Legislature's
intent clear that not all of these items must be addressed.
Regarding the one planning component that addresses ''public services, facilities, and
utilities," the County is to provide an "analysis showing general plans for ... power plant sites,
utility transmission corridors ... and related services." LC. § 67-6508(h) (emphasis added). As
the District Court correctly held below, use of the word "general" reflects the Legislature's intent
that a local government not get caught up into micro-managing these elements; instead, given the
plain meaning of the word "general," the plan should be "concerned with main elements rather
than limited details." MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY, "General," available at
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/e:eneral (last accessed April 7, 2014).
Case law establishes two important instructions in interpreting whether a comprehensive
plan is valid. First, a plan must address each statutorily required component; otherwise, the plan
may be struck. Sprenger, Grubb & Associates, Inc. v. City of Hailey, 133 Idaho 320, 986 P.2d
343 (1999). So long as each component is addressed, however, Idaho courts have consistently
If any of the sixteen planning components do not apply within any particular jurisdiction, the local government
may simply specify "reasons why a particular component is unneeded." I.C. § 67-6508.

6
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recognized comprehensive plans as legislative action, meaning there is a "great deference
given ... [due to its] high visibility and widely felt impact, on the theory that appropriate remedy
can be had at the polls." Cooper v. Board of County Comm'rs ofAda County, 101 Idaho 407,
410, 614 P.2d 947, 950 (1980). See also Gay v. County Comm 'rs of Bonneville County, 103
Idaho 626, 628, 651 P.2d 560, 562 (1982) ("This restrained standard of review is appropriate to
such legislative determinations as the adoption of comprehensive plans .... ").
As illustrated below, the County addressed the statutorily required components in its
Comprehensive Plan. The County should be given the deference that it is due.

2. The County Addressed Each Statutorily Mandated Component in its
Comprehensive Plan
H-Hook first raised the issue of the validity of the Comprehensive Plan over three years
ago at hearings before the County in connection with the amendment to the Comprehensive Plan

that was adopted by the County before the Application was ever submitted. Appellant's Brief, at
16. The County properly rejected H-Hook's claims at that time and no appeal was filed.
This recycled argument attacks a legislative decision by the County that was the result of
considerable effort and expense. The Comprehensive Plan came only after an extensive hearing
process that commenced in 2004. An advisory committee and four citizen working groups,
including a representative from Idaho Power, Keith Kolar (Ag. R. p. 4272), met repeatedly
throughout the process. Planning policy questions with regard to "Public Services, Facilities,
and Utilities" were considered at length. Ag. R. p. 4225-4239.
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It is important to recall that the Comprehensive Plan has a ten-year planning horizon.
Ag. R. p. 4175. The Comprehensive Plan addresses each of the statutorily mandated components
within that window. With regard to "public services, facilities, and utilities, the Comprehensive
Plan discusses previous and existing conditions, trends, desirable goals and objectives, and
desirable future situations, exceeding Idaho Code Section 67-6508's requirement to discuss just
one of these items. The County discusses previous and existing conditions in Comprehensive
Plan Section 9.2.7.1., which describes electrical providers, generation facilities, and electrical
rates. Ag. R. p. 4234. Trends for the next ten years are discussed in Section 9.3, with the County
concluding that Idaho Power Company will continue to offer electrical service "to all developed
portions of the county, as needed" and that consumption of electricity is actually "declining due
to enhanced technological efficiency in transmission and distribution." Ag. R. p. 4236. The
Comprehensive Plan also discusses desirable future situations, with the County concluding that
the current provider is in a position to continue to provide adequate service during the current
planning window; one area that may require improvement is in Sand Hollow. Ag. R. p. 4237.
With regard to power plant sites, the County is not a public utilities commission and
LLUPA is not a facilities-siting statute. This fact is recognized in LLUPA, which requires the
County to come up with only a "general" plan for power plant sites. With this in mind, the
Comprehensive Plan states that "Electric Power is available to all county residents through Idaho
Power Company. Electricity is generated by hydroelectric facilities located at Brownlee,
Oxbow, and Hells Canyon dams on the Snake River, adjacent to Washington County." Ag. R. p.

RESPONDENT AND INTERVENOR'S BRIEF - 15

4234. Electric pmver may also be provided by the Idaho Power Company-owned Langley Gulch
plant recently approved by the County. Id.
Given the fact that the County is only required to come up with a "general" plan for
pmver plant sites in the County, and given the fact that the County concluded that the current
facilities are adequate during the Comprehensive Plan's ten-year planning window, the
Comprehensive Plan fully satisfies Idaho Code's planning requirements.

3. H-Hook's Argument Misstates the Content of the Comprehensive Plan
In disregard of the above, H-Hook claims that "fnJo consideration in the County's
comprehensive plan was given to trends, compatibility of land uses, desirable goals and
objectives, or desirable future situations concerning power plant siting or utility transmission
corridors. The matter was simply unaddressed." Appellant's Brief; at 15-16. On its face, this is a
misportrayal of the record before this Court. As illustrated above, the County actually went
above and beyond its duty, addressing each of the items identified in Idaho Code Section 676508(h) when only one would have sufficed. H-Hook's claim that the Comprehensive Plan is
missing "a statutorily required element" (Appellant's Brief; at 19) is mere wishful thinking.
Nothing in Idaho Code or case law requires the County to micromanage the plans of
sophisticated electrical utilities by designating specific power plant sites within the County.
LLUPA calls for general planning by the local government. Even if the County's analysis was
unreasonable (it clearly was not), the County's approach to compiling its Comprehensive Plan is
legislative action entitled to "great deference" ( Cooper, 101 Idaho at 410) and should be upheld.
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4. The Comprehensive Plan Amendment Acknowledges that Future Applications
\Viii Be Considered in Light of the Planning Efforts Already Contained in the
Comprehensive Plan
Despite the fact that the Comprehensive Plan satisfies the County's planning duties, the
County nevertheless agreed to an amendment to Section 9 .2. 7 .1 of the Comprehensive Plan.
This amendment acknowledges the fact that energy producers-public or private-may approach
the County with future applications. Such applications will be considered not only based on
LLUP A and then-existing County code, but also based on the planning efforts contained in "this
plan." Ag. R. p. 3883. This language does not detract from the County's efforts to address each
of the statutorily mandated factors in its Comprehensive Plan, including analysis for public
services, facilities, and utilities. Indeed, the Board stated at the time that they believed the prior
planning efforts were adequate to meet their responsibilities under Idaho Code. Ag. R. p. 3870.
Instead, the amendment was an acknowledgement that energy producers-including private
energy producers-may come to the County and seek to operate at some future date. As would
be expected, any such application will be considered based on the rules in place at the time such
an application is submitted. The amendment is simply recognition of this basic fact.

5. H-Hook Misportrays the District Court's Decision, Which Reiterates the
County's Limited Planning Obligations Under I.C. § 67-6508
H-Hook's argument misses the point of Judge Huskey's reasoning. Judge Huskey was
correct in stating that only a "general" plan is required. Order on Appeal and Order of Remand
in CVJl-959 (the "Order"), at 33-35 (R. p. 311-313) and the Order's deferential take on the

County's planning requirements is appropriate.
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If there is any error in Judge Huskey's decision, it is in her statement that the
·'Comprehensive Plan, before the amendment, spends two paragraphs identifying what power is
available to county residents, but does not discuss where in the County, if at all, those power
plants are located. Order, at 34 (R. p. 312). As noted above, the Comprehensive Plan does
identify the location of these power plants, v,-hich the County determined vmuld provide
adequate power during the Comprehensive Plan's ten-year planning window. Ag. R. p. 4234.
Yet, even if the County had not undertaken the planning efforts described above, the District
Court was correct in concluding that "address! ing] the requests as the requests are made"
satisfies the requirement of a "general plan." Order, at 35 (R. p. 313). This standard is sufficient
to satisfy the limited planning mandate of Idaho Code Section 67-6508.

C. THE APPROVAL OF THE REZONE IS NOT SPOT ZONING
H-Hook next argues that the approval of the Application constitutes "spot zoning." As
shown more fully below, H-Hook's claim is, once again, misplaced.
1. Idaho Tests for Validity of Alleged Spot Zoning

Under current Idaho cases, "Type One" spot zoning refers to "[a] rezoning of property for
a use prohibited by the original zoning classification. The test for whether such a zone
reclassification is valid is whether the zone change is in accord with the comprehensive plan."

Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71, 76-77, 73 P.3d 84, 89-90 (2003) (emphasis added).
Meanwhile, "Type two spot zoning refers to a zone change that singles out a parcel of land for
use inconsistent with the permitted use in the rest of the zoning district for the benefit of an
individual property owner." Evans, 139 Idaho at 77.
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The relationship between Type One and Type Two spot zoning has been the subject of
recent decisions. In Evans, this Court dismissed a generic spot zoning claim because the
requested rezone was in compliance with the comprehensive plan. Evans, 139 Idaho at 76-77.
Taylor v. Canyon County Bd of Com 'rs. 147 Idaho 424, 210 P.3d 532 (2009) reached the same
result in the face of a claim of illegal Type Two spot zoning, holding that a court need look no
further if the rezone is in accordance with the comprehensive plan. Id. at 43 7.

2. The Proposed Rezone Does Not Constitute Illegal Spot Zoning
i.

The County's Decision on the Application Does Not Constitute Invalid Type One
Spot Zoning

The County, as an exercise of is legislative power, has stated in its Comprehensive Plan
that this area of the County is planned to promote industrial-including heavy industrial-uses.
The amendment to the Comprehensive Plan confirming this change was complete June 21, 2010.
Ag. R. p. 93-160; 3822-81; 3883-90. Thereafter, AEHI requested a change in zoning from A
(Agricultural) to I-2 (heavy industrial). The Application's rezoning request was, therefore, in
precise conformance with the Comprehensive Plan and, therefore, the Type One spot zoning that
occurred in this case is valid. See Taylor, 147 Idaho at 424.
H-Hook counters by arguing, first, that the amendment to the Comprehensive Plan
designating the Property as industrial "circumvent[s] the prohibitions on spot zoning ... [because
it] allow[s] the spot zoning to occur." Appellant's Brief, at 26. In order to make its argument, HHook is trotting out a new cause of action alleging that a comprehensive plan may not be
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amended (what H-Hook calls "spot amended") to allow for future rezones

Appellant ·s Brief;

at 25)-a theory for which H-Hook provides no precedent and no legal support.
This novel theory flies in the face of the statutory authorization for comprehensive
planning and zoning. Under LLUPA, local governments are '·to prepare, implement, and review
and update a comprehensive plan .... '' I.C. § 67-6508 (emphasis added). Any person may
petition for a comprehensive plan amendment at any time. I.C. § 67-6509(d). Most importantly
for these purposes, LLUPA specifically states that if a local government finds that a rezone
request is not in accord with its comprehensive plan, the local government may consider an
amendment to its comprehensive plan and then, post-plan amendment, consider the rezone
request. LC. § 67-6511(2)(c). H-Hook's argument contradicts this clear authority.
Ignoring this statutory authority is the only way H-Hook can argue the rezone was invalid
Type One spot zoning. Given the fact that the Comprehensive Plan was amended by the County
to allow industrial use at the Property, and given the fact that the Board's rezone findings that the
industrial zone is in accord with the Comprehensive Plan, as amended, are supported by
substantial competent evidence (Ag. R. p. 4159), the Type One spot zoning alleged by H-Hook is
valid and the rezone should be upheld. See Evans, 139 Idaho at 77.
ll.

The County's Decision on the Application Does Not Constitute Invalid Type Two
Spot Zoning

H-Hook next claims that the Application is "undisputedly type two spot zoning" and,
therefore, must be invalidated. The District Court did not agree.
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Again. Type Two spot zoning "refers to a zone change that singles out a parcel of land
for use inconsistent with the permitted use in the rest of the zoning district for the benefit of an
individual property owner." Evans, 139 Idaho at 77. H-Hook mischaracterizes the record when
it suggests this use-on 500 acres in a very rural part of the County-is inconsistent with area
uses. H-Hook may believe that the Property is poorly suited for industrial use (see Appellant's
Brief, at 4), but the Board, based on substantial and competent evidence, found the opposite:

The surrounding uses include agriculture, confined animal feeding operations (CAFO), a
county landfill and residential. The surrounding agricultural property is not deemed
prime agricultural. Clay Peak Landfill is located approximately three miles northwest of
the subject property. There are four (4) CAFOs within five miles. In addition, the
proposed facility is over three miles away from the nearest residence.
Ag. R. p. 4156. Based upon these findings, the Board concluded that "[t]he zoning proposed is
compatible with surrounding uses and zones." Id. This finding, of itself, is a sufficient basis for
this Court to conclude that there was no Type Two spot zoning in this case.
Meanwhile, the District Court decided, based on analysis set forth in Taylor, that the spot
zoning claim should be dismissed because "the Board's finding that the rezone is in accordance
with the Amended Comprehensive Plan is supported by substantial, competent, although
conflicting, evidence in the record and therefore, must be affirmed." Order, at 36 (R. p. 314). HHook believes this conclusion is in error because it would "make type two spot zoning a nullity"
(Appellant's Brie_{, at 28); however, H-Hook overstates its case. Even after Taylor and Evans,

Type One and Type Two spot zoning remain valid descriptors of a zoning action. An approved
rezone may still fall within either of these categories and could be deemed invalid on either
basis. Type Two spot zoning still exists-the distinction is that a rezoning action will be upheld
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over an allegation that it is invalid if the rezone is in conformance with a comprehensive planor, in other words, if the Type One spot zoning alleged is valid.
This Court's decisions in Evans and Taylor address this point definitively. In Evans, the
petitioners alleged a rezone was "inconsistent with the permitted use in the rest of the zoning
district and violates the Comprehensive Plan." Evans, 139 Idaho at 76. Thus, while no labels
were applied, it appears both Type One and Type T\vo spot zoning were alleged in that case.
This made no difference to the Evans Court which dismissed the spot zoning claim in its entirety
because the rezone was in accordance with the comprehensive plan: "The appellants' claim of
spot zoning need not be addressed because the type one 'spot zoning' in this case is valid."

Evans, 139 Idaho at 77. The Taylor petitioners (the Vickers), meanwhile, were very specific
when they argued ·'that the Board committed an illegal type two spot zoning by singling out
Savala's property for commercial use in the midst of an agricultural zoning district merely for
Savala's private gain." Taylor, 147 Idaho at 436. Canyon County argued, in response, that the
rezone was in compliance with the comprehensive plan "and, therefore ... there is no need to
address the [petitioners'] claim of type two spot zoning." Id. The Taylor Court agreed with
Canyon County, concluding the Vickers' "claim of spot zoning need not be addressed since the
type one spot zoning that occurred in this case is valid." Id. at 437.
H-Hook's suggestion that the District Court's decision stands "for the proposition that
there is no type two spot zoning in Idaho" (Appellant's Brief, at 29) ignores these clear holdings
in Taylor and Evans. Again, Type Two spot zoning may still occur; however, any such rezone
will be upheld if there is a finding that the rezone is in accordance with a comprehensive plan.
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H-Hook' s last-ditch spot-zoning argument is that Taylor is distinguishable from the facts
of this case because, according to H-Hook, only Type One spot zoning occurred in Taylor. This
read of Taylor is simply wrong. Taylor very clearly included an allegation of Type Two spot
zoning. In fact, one of the Taylor Court's headings in its decision concluded that "The Board

did not commit illegal type two spot zoning." Taylor, 147 Idaho at 436 (emphasis as in
original). The Taylor Court could not have been more explicit when it stated there was "no need
to address the Vickers' claim of type two spot zoning" once the determination had been made
that the rezone \Vas in conformance with the comprehensive plan. Id. (emphasis added).
There is no distinction between Taylor and these facts. H-Hook's claim to the contrary is
without merit.

D. THE NOTICE AND HEARING PROCEDURE FOLLOWED BY THE COUNTY
COMPLIED WITH LLUPA AND THE PAYETTE COUNTY CODE
H-Hook's final argument on appeal attacks the notice and procedure followed by the
County. To be clear, Petitioners attacked the County for a wide variety of alleged notice errors
below; however, H-Hook acknowledges that the District Court rejected each of these claims and
H-Hook has not appealed any of these findings. 7
However, H-Hook now claims that the District Court did not resolve one argument: that
H-Hook did not have adequate opportunity to review the draft Development Agreement. To be
clear, the District Court concluded in its Order that "there were no Due Process violations in the

It is noted, however, that the Conclusion of the Appellant's Brief (see Page 42) indicates that "the hearing process
was illegally rendered unfair by several due process violations affecting substantial rights." Given Appellant's
statement to the contrary on Page 31 of its brief, any appeal based on other alleged "due process violations" beyond
that specifically asserted in the Appellant's Brief should be deemed waived.
7
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manner in which the hearing was conducted and the Petitioners have not established any
violation of a fundamental right on this basis to establish harm.'' Order, at 63 (R.p. 341).
Nevertheless, this claim is also \:vi th out merit. Even if there were a notice violation, no
substantial injury has occurred.

L Basic Standards in Idaho Law for Notice
''Procedural due process requires some process to ensure that the individual is not
arbitrarily deprived of his or her rights in violation of the state or federal constitutions. This
requirement is met when the defendant is provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard."
Neighbors for a Healthy Gold Fork v. Valley County, 145 Idaho 121, 127, 176 P.3d 126, 132
(2007) (citing Cowan v. Board ofCom'rs ofFremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 148 P.3d 1247
(2006)). The basic standard in Idaho law is that an affected person must be given ·'notice of the
type of issues and evidence that [are J likely to arise at the hearing and the types of evidence they
may [wish] to present to rebut [an applicant's] claims." Evans v. Board of Coni'rs of Cassia
County, Idaho, 137 Idaho 428,432, 50 P.3d 443,447 (2002).

2. H-Hook Participated Fully in the Hearings Before the County
The County satisfied each of its requirements for providing written and published notice.
H-Hook does not contest that notices were timely mailed or published and no issue related to
these notices is on appeal. Nor does H-Hook contest the many additional steps undertaken by
the County to ensure the public had notice of the type of issues and evidence likely to arise at
hearing, as noted on pages 5 and 6 above.
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There is no evidence in the record that H-Hook was caught unaware with the Application.
The record shows that H-Hook and several of the Petitioners participated in the County's
comprehensive plan amendment hearings, which concluded in April 2010, and which was the
precursor to AEHI filing its Application. Ag. R. p. 153-160. H-Hook provided testimony (Ag. R.
p. 111-112) and participated through its attorney. Ag. R. p. 125-126.
H-Hook's subsequently participated extensively throughout the proceedings related to the
Application. H-Hook was one of the named participants in the appeal before the Board in
February 2011. Ag. R. p. 3468. Through its attorney, James Undenvood, H-Hook submitted, in
addition to oral argument, forty-one pages of argument in its appeal filing, brief, and reply brief.
Ag. R. p. 3467-3482: 3486-3512; 3536-3540. Prior to the June 6, 2011 Board hearing, H-Hook
and the Petitioners gathered thirty-eight pages of petitions (Ag. R. p. 3565-3604 )8 and submitted
additional letters to the County. See, e.g., Ag. R. p. 3562-63 (James Underwood); 3604-09 (Betty
and Joseph Bercik); 3610 (Jo Ann Jeffries); 3655-56 (Jeff and Debbie Weber); 3909 (Jo Ann
Jeffries); and 3911-12 (Michael Humphreys/H Hook). H-Hook's attorney submitted an
additional twenty-six (26) pages of written legal argument and testimony (Ag. R. p. 3660-86), to
which was attached several exhibits constituting 221 additional pages. Ag. R. p. 3687-3908.
This is all in addition to the testimony provided by H-Hook's principal, Michael
Humphreys, at hearing. This point is critical: Mr. Humphreys spoke at length about the
development agreement during his testimony. June 6,2011 Tr. p. 98-101. At no point in that
testimony does Mr. Humphreys claim that he did not have an opportunity to read the proposed

8

The Board also had before it forty-two pages of petitions in support of the project. Ag. R p. 3923-3965.
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development agreement in its entirety: to the contrary, Mr. Humphreys offered detailed
criticisms of the development agreement, including its term and its obligations. Id. Mr.
Humphreys follmved his verbal testimony with a letter submitted at the hearing that reiterated his
opinions regarding the form and content of the Development Agreement. Ag. R. 3911-3912.
Clearly, H-Hook had an opportunity to review the Development Agreement in detail.
Without question, H-Hook participated meaningfully with an understanding of the types of
issues and evidence likely to arise at the hearing. Evans, 137 Idaho at 432.

3. The District Court Was Correct in Concluding There \Vere No Notice Defects in
the Procedure Followed by the County
Even after all the effort expended by the County and even in light of its extensive
participation and direct discussion of the Development Agreement at public hearings, H-Hook
still construes its notice rights as having been violated.
Before addressing H-Hook's specific argument, it is important to keep in mind the
procedure for considering development agreements, which is set by the governing board by
ordinance. J.C. § 67-651 lA. Payette County Code does not require that a development
agreement be submitted with an application for rezone. "In the event a development agreement
is proposed by the developer or the administrator at the time an application is submitted or in the
event a development agreement is deemed appropriate by the commission during or after a
public hearing, the reasons for proposing the use of a development agreement shall be forwarded
to the board ... with the commission's findings and recommendation." PCC § 8-5-11. C (emphasis
added). While the Board could have requested a development agreement even if one had not
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been proposed, there is no requirement in Payette County Code that the development agreement
be finalized prior to the hearing as a "development agreement may be made a condition of
approval." Id. § 8-5-11.D (emphasis added). If a condition of approval, then the agreement
\vould necessarily be finalized per the Board's instruction, post-hearing.
H-Hook disregards these points and instead implies that no proposed development
agreement was available for public review until shortly before the public hearing. In order to
make its case, H-Hook provides a description that is at best ambiguous and at worst a
misstatement of the record:
The P&Z Commission's published notice of its December hearing declared that a
proposed development agreement would be added to the public record by November 17,
2010, a week after the notice was published. That development agreement. .. was not
actually included in the public record and made available for public review, until
November 24, 2010, one day before the Thanksgiving holiday, two days before the cutoff
date for written comment and just eight days before the public hearing. This failure to
timely file the proposed development agreement made it essentially impossible for HHook to comment on the most important document in the application.
Appellant's Brief; at 12. The record actually shows that a draft development agreement was

included with the Application when first filed on June 22, 2010 and was available for public
review from that date. Ag. R. p. 3; 199-221. It was uploaded to the County website on
November 8, 2010. Ag. R. p. 3518. A revised draft of the development agreement-containing
only the County prosecutor's proposed revisions-was uploaded to the County website on
November 24, 2010. Id. Thus, H-Hook and the Petitioners had nearly a week before the
Commission hearing to review and consider the revised development agreement.
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After the Commission hearing in December 20 l 0, the draft development agreement was
again revised in light of the Commission's recommendation. This revision was released with the
County's staff report eleven days prior to the June 6, 2011 Board hearing. Ag. R. p. 4028-80.
The revisions to the Development Agreement were color-coded, showing changes made by the
County Prosecutor (in red) made and included in the draft of the Development Agreement
reviewed by the Commission. Ag. R. p. 4041. Changes requested directly by the Commission
were noted in blue: changes requested as a result of a review by Bert Osborn (at the request of
the Commission) were noted in purple; and other clean-up changes were noted in green. Id.
Given this effort to provide the public with not only an updated draft eleven days prior to the
hearing, but a draft that allowed the public to track the date and the source of those changes, it is
clear H-Hook is not being forthright when it says it was "impossible ... to comment on the most
important document in the application." Appellant's Brief, at 12. This claim is particularly
suspect when the Agency Record shows that H-Hook, in fact, did provide comment.
There was no violation in the County's procedure, which must be considered against the
standard described in Evans v. Board of Commissioners of' Cassia County, 137 Idaho 428, 50
P.3d 443 (2002). Notice is sufficient if it "give[s] members of the public notice of the types of
issues and evidence that were likely to arise at the hearing and the types of evidence they may
have wished to present to rebut" an applicant's claims. Evans, 137 Idaho at 432. Given the
extent of its participation and the time it had to consider even the revised draft of the
development agreement, it is clear that H-Hook had notice of the "types of issues and evidence
that were likely to arise at the hearing." Id.
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Rather than acknowledge this basic notice requirement as set forth

Evans. H-Hook

instead relies on Johnson v. City of Homedale, 118 Idaho 285, 796 P.2d 162 (Ct.App. 1990) and
Fischer v. City o{Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349, 109 P.3d 1091 (2005). However, the error in both
those cases was the failure to include mandated element of an application. The Application
element H-Hook complains was not available-the development agreement-was provided with
AEHI's Application filing in June 2010 (Ag. R. p.3: 199-221) and was at all times available for
public review. There was no missing component in this case. Johnson and Fischer do not apply.
The question is whether the Evans standard was met. Without question, any member of
the public-including H-Hook-had the ability to understand "the types of issues and evidence"
in the development agreement that would be considered by the Board and the Commission. As
shown above, H-Hook did, in fact, read the development and its principal provided testimony at
the June 2011 hearing. June 6, 2011 Tr. p. 98-101. There was no due process violation.

4. Given Its Extensive Participation in the Hearings Before the Commission and
the Board, H-Hook Has Suffered No Substantial Injury Based on an Alleged
Notice Defect
There was no notice issue in this case. Even if there had been, no substantial right of HHook has been prejudiced by the process followed in the County's hearings.
Before its claim can have any traction with this Court, H-Hook must show prejudice to its
substantial rights. LLUPA imposes this gatekeeping standard to ensure"[ o ]nly those whose
challenge to a decision demonstrates actual harm or violation of fundamental rights, not the mere
possibility thereof, shall be entitled to a remedy or reversal of a decision." I.C. § 67-6535(3).
The Idaho Administrative Procedure Act repeats this requirement, stating "agency action shall be
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affirmed unless substantial rights of

appellant have been prejudiced. I.C. § 67-5279

A

court "may therefore affirm a governing board's decision solely on the grounds that the
petitioner has not shown prejudice to a substantial right." Hcnvkins, 151 Idaho at 232.
In reviewing the decisions of zoning boards, courts are to look at the proceedings as a
whole and "evaluate the adequacy of procedures and the resultant decision in light of practical
considerations with an emphasis on fundamental fairness and the essentials of reasoned decisionmaking." LC. § 67-6535(3). See also Spencer v. Kootenai County, 145 [daho 448, 454, 180 P.3d
487, 493 (2008). Fair-not perfect-is the applicable due process standard. Terrazas v. Blaine

County ex rel. Bd. ofCom'rs, 147 Idaho 193,203,207 P.3d 169, 179 (2009). "Only those whose
challenge to a decision demonstrates actual harm or violation of fundamental rights, not the mere
possibility thereof, shall be entitled to a remedy .... " LC. § 67-6535(3).
Whether an alleged notice error violates substantial rights is determined by considering
whether a petitioner had the opportunity to participate in public hearings. See Cowan v. Board of

Com'rs of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501,508, 148 P.3d 1247, 1254 (2006). That participation
may be direct or through the petitioner's attorneys. Id. The Cowan case is particularly
instructive on this point. In Cowan, the notices were actually (and admittedly) defective. This
Court nevertheless held there was no violation of Cowan' s substantial rights:
Here, the Board concedes that both notices were defective. Nonetheless, Cowan has
failed to demonstrate that his substantial rights were prejudiced by either defective notice.
First, Cowan's counsel attended the July 30, 2001 hearing and submitted a brief objecting
to the notice. Moreover, Cowan spoke against the application at that hearing. Therefore,
even if the notice were defective, Cowan has failed to demonstrate how this defect
prejudiced his substantial rights since he clearly had notice of the meeting.
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Coivan, 143 Idaho at 513. Similarly, in Neighbors for a Healthy Gold Fork v. Valley County,

145 Idaho 121, 126, 176 P.3d 126, 131 (2007), this Court concluded that "[a]lthough Neighbors
did not present oral evidence at the first Board hearing, the meeting minutes indicate that. .. their
attorney, presented a binder full of exhibits and a written objection, all of which were contained
in the record and considered by the Board." Neighbors, 145 Idaho at 128. This led the Court to
conclude that "Neighbors clearly had an adequate opportunity to be heard, and thus was not
denied due process." Id.
In light of H-Hook's and H-Hook's attorney's extensive participation before the
Commission and the Board, it is clear that H-Hook suffered no such harm or violation of
fundamental rights based upon any alleged failure of notice. Even if there had been a failure of
notice, H-Hook submitted hundreds of pages of written comments and provided verbal testimony
throughout. H-Hook's principal provided extensive comments on the development agreement
itself during the June 2011 hearing. June 6, 2011 Tr. p. 98-101; Ag. R. p. 3911-3912. This belies
any suggestion that H-Hook's participation was less than meaningful. There has been no
violation of H-Hook's substantial rights based on a notice violation.
IV.
CONCLUSION

The County and AEHI respectfully request that this appeal be denied as: (1) the
Comprehensive Plan is valid; (2) no illegal spot zoning occurred in this case; and (3) there was
no notice violation and certainly no injury to a substantial right given H-Hook's extensive
participation in the public hearings related to this matter.

RESPONDENT AND INTERVENOR'S BRIEF - 31

Pj

2014-04-11 13:06

Spink Butler P 1/1

2086426099 >>

Payette County Pros

I

/

DATED this 11 th day of April 2014.

!
i

/

,,/

\

I

I

!
I

/

/

/

/

rosecuting Attorney

I
I
I

SPINK BUTLER, LLP

T. Hethe Clark
Attomeys for Alternate Energy Holdings Inc.

I

I

I.

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

RESPONDENT AND INTERVENOR'S BRIEF - 32

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 11 th day of April 2014, I caused a true and correct
copy of the above RESPONDENT AND INTERVENOR'S BRIEF to be served upon the
following individuals in the manner indicated below:
Anne-Marie Kelso
Payette County Attorney's Office
1130 Third Avenue North, Room #105
Payette, ID 83661
Facsimile: 208/642-6099
akcl so@pa vettecount v. or£?:
Stephen A. Bradbury
Williams Bradbury, P.C.
1015 West Hays Street
Boise. ID 83702
Facsimile: 208/344-0077
steve@\villiamsbradbury.com
Thomas A. Banducci
Wade L. Woodard
Dara L. Parker
Andersen Banducci PLLC
101 S. Capitol Boulevard, Suite 1600
Boise, ID 83702
Facsimile: 208/342-4455
tab@andersenbanducci.com
wlw@andersenbanducci.com
dl p@andersenbanducci.com

[X] U.S. Mail - 2 bound copies
[ J Hand-Delivery
I ] Federal Express
[ ] Via Facsimile
[ ] Via E-Mail

[X] U.S. Mail

[ ] Federal Express
[ ] Via Facsimile
f ] Via E-Mail

[X] U.S. Mail 2 bound copies
[ ] Hand-Delivery
[ ] Federal Express
f ] Via Facsimile
[ ] Via E-Mail

T. Hethe Clark

RESPONDENT AND INTERVENOR'S BRIEF - 33

2 bound copies

[ I Hand-Delivery

